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The choice of law provisions of the Uni/brm Commercial
Code often have been criticized on the basis that they are
forum oriented, so forum oriented that their constitutionality
may be questionable. The authors of this article analyze the
basic Code choice of law section (UCC § 1-105) and conclude
that this section need not be read with the heavy emphasis on
the forum's version of the Code as suggested by some other
writers. Instead, the argument is made that the Code's choice
of law principles permit development in accordance with the
forum's general notions of choice of law. Additionally, the
Code can provide impetus Jbr complete acceptance of party
autonomy in selecting the systenm of law which will govern the
rights and duties of the parties to a contract.
M any law review pages have been devoted to the task of
proving that the choice of law provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code are unsound and perhaps even unconstitutional.'
Such critical analyses had* their purpose when the Code was in
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draft form, while there was still a chance that the language could
be changed; but now that the Code is the law of the country, the
time has come to take the statutory language (such as it is) and, if
possible, give it a construction which both accomplishes the
purpose of the draftsmen and promotes the policies underlying
rational choice of law principles.
The Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted in 51
jurisdictions, and the resulting uniformity should avoid a great
many of the choice of law problems which have plagued pre-Code
lawyers and courts. Unfortunately, this wide-spread acceptance has
not completely eliminated the need for choice of law rules in
-ommercial transactions. No foreign nation has yet adopted the
Code, and most states have altered various sections to reflect some
local policy. Moreover, courts have and will continue to interpret
the same Code sections differently.2 These facts add up to a not-so-
startling conclusion: even though commercial transactions are
regulated by a fairly uniform group of statutes in this country,
international transactions and even transactions bet,..4en Code
states will continue to generate choice of law problems.
The Code contains six sections specifically designed to aid in
the solution of these problems. The basic section is contained in
Article I and establishes three rules:
1. For five factual patterns-transactions controlled by Code
provisions dealing with rights of creditors against goods sold, bank
deposits and collections, bulk transfers, investment securities, and
secured transactions-the law of a particular jurisdiction is to be
applied by all states In general, these are situations in which a
-The differing legislative and judicial treatment given to the privity problem is one area of
substantive law in which the choice of law question can be determinative of the results in a
particular case. Other statutory differences include: (I) the omission by Mississippi of UCC
§ 2-316, MISS. CODE AN .§ 4 IA (Spec. U.C.C. Supp. 1969); (2) the omission of UCC § 2-302
by California, CAL. Co.ItM. CODE § 2302 (West Supp. 1964). and North Carolina. N.C. GE..
STAT. § 25-2-302 (1965); (3) the increase by Oklahoma in the statutory period in UCC § 2-725
to live years, OKLA. STAT. A,,.\. tit. 12A. § 2-725 (1963); (4) the provision in the Colorado
Code that the four-year pdriod of limitations may not be varied by agreement, COLo. Rav.
STAT. ANN. § 155-2-725 (1963); and (5) the provision in the Massachusetts Code providing
that there are no implied warranties in contracts to sell human blood, blood plasma, or other
human tissues or organs from a blood bank or reservoir for tissue and organs, MAss. Gr-.N.
LAws A-%. ch. 106, § 2-316(5) (Supp. 1968). These are cited as illustrative, and not as limiting
the number of instances in which choice of law can determine the results of the case.
U.SWOR', COM tERCIAL CODE § 1-105(2) [hereinafter cited as UCC]. This section refers
to live other Code sections which provide the choice of law rules for the factual patterns
listed in § 1-105(2).
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third party is likely to become involved and in which a type of situs
law can reasonably be selected as the controlling law.
2. Aside from these situations, the Code provides that the
parties to a transaction are free, with some limitations, to choose
which system of law will govern their rights and duties.4
3. If the parties fail to choose the applicable law and if the
transaction is not one of the five mentioned above, the Code of the
forum state is to be applied to transactions bearing an appropriate
relation to the forum state?
It is the latter two rules, as set forth in 1-105(1), which cause
difficulties of construction and application:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when .a transaction
bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or
nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of
such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties.
Failing such agreement this Act applies to transactions bearing an
appropriate relation to this state
The problems created by this provision, its relation to traditional
conflict of laws rules, and suggested solutions form the subject
matter of this article.
THE REASONABLE RELATION TEST
Although the wisdom of a choice of law rule which allows
parties to a commercial transaction to select their governing law
has been questioned,7 the Code's answer is clear: parties who care
UCC § 1-105(l).
" Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
E.g.. Szold. Uomnzents on Tentative Draft No. 6 of the Restatement tSecondl. Conflict
of Laws Contracts, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1524 (1963); Weintraub, The Contracts Proposals of
the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws- A Critique, 46 IoWA L. REV. 713 (1961).
Proressor Weintraub has attacked the wisdom or party autonomy but recognizes that
-section 1-105(1) is Jait accompli. and tilting at windmills, although good artery-flushing
exercise, is somewhat discouraging, especially when. as here, the windmills show no sign of
weakening." Weintraub. Choice of Law Jor Products Liability: The Impact of the Uniform
Commercial C'ode and Recent and Developments in Conflicts Analysis. 44 TEXAS L. REV.
1429, 1434 (1966).
-or articles supporting party autonomy see Braucher, Impromptu Remarks. 76 HAV. L.
REv. 1718 (1963); Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Comlict of Laws. 53 COLUMi. L.
REv. 1072 (1953): Tuchler, Boundaries to Party Autonom1 in the Uniform Comnmercial
Code: .4 Radical 'iew. II ST. Louis L.J. 180 (1967). Yntema, Contract and Conflict of
Laws: "Autoaomny'" in Choice of Law i the L nited States. I N.Y.L.F. 46 (1955).
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to plan with possible disputes in mind may specify which system of
law will govern their rights and duties. This autonomy, however, is
not unfettered. There are limitations on the transactions in which a
selection may be made, on the law which may be selected, and on
the persons affected by the choice8 Moreover, any provision
regarding the governing law must be agreed upon by both parties.
The Need Jbr a Reasonable Relation
The Code permits parties to select the law which will govern
their rights and duties provided that their transaction bears a
"reasonable relation" to the state or nation whose law is selected. 0
The inference is that if the parties choose the law of some state
which has no reasonable relation to the transaction, that choice will
not be recognized. There appear to be no theoretical objections to
allowing the parties complete freedom of choice as to applicable
law,"' just as they may bargain over any other term of their
agreement. Nevertheless, the Code clearly limits their choice,
perhaps to protect courts from having to apply a bizarre foreign
law chosen by caprice. Such fears would seem to be misplaced,
however, for given the financial implications of a commercial
transaction, few contracting parties are apt to agree that their
rights and duties are to be governed by a law which has no
connection with their transaction. 2 Further, these "built-in"
limitations do not protect courts from being confronted with
unfamiliar law in those instances in which the transaction does bear
a reasonable relation to a foreign country.
Most of the cases in which courts will be called upon to
consider the reasonable relation test of 1-105 will be fairly easy to
decide.' 3 The situations in which parties tend to agree upon
8 UCC § 1-105().
9Id.
Id.
' Practical objections to an unfettered rule allowing party autonomy are suggested in W.
COOK. LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 412-18 (1942).
2 "'A court will not apply the chosen law if the parties had no reasonable basis for
selecting it. The court will not, for example, apply foreign law which has been selected by the
parties in the spirit of adventure or to provide mental exercise for the judge. Situations of
this sort do not arise in practice. Contracts are entered into for serious purposes and rarely,
if ever, will the parties choose a governing law without good reason to do so." RESTATEMIENT
(SEcOND). CONFLICT OF LAWs § 332a, comment f (Tent. Draft No. 6. 1960).
"See. e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Indus. Corp.. 380 F. Supp. 698, 711 (E.D.
Pa. 1968).
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applicable law are those in which the contacts are divided, roughly
equally, between two or more jurisdictions. In such a case the
parties' choice of law should be upheld if the only challenge is that
the connection is not reasonable. There will, however, be a few
cases, as measured by the total number of disputes, in which the
state or nation whose law is chosen will have only a minimal
connection with the facts of the transaction: for example, it may be
only the domicile of one or both of the parties, the place from
which the offer was made, the place from which the goods were
shipped, the principal place of business of one or both of the
parties, 4 or the situs of the property sold. The question then
becomes whether any one of these contacts will satisfy the
"reasonable relation" test of 1-105.
With respect to this requirement the Comment to 1-105 states,
in necessarily vague terms, that "[in general, the test of
'reasonable relation' is similar to that laid down by the Supreme
Court in Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 47
S. Ct. 626, 71 L. Ed. 1123 (1927). Ordinarily the law chosen must
be that of a jurisdiction where a significant enough portion of the
making or performance of the contract is to occur or occurs."' 15 No
one, not even the drafters of 1-105, could detail all of the factors
which, in every case, will constitute a "reasonable" relation.
However, the last quoted sentence, which at first appears only to
substitute "significant" in place of "reasonable," may provide a
guideline to aid in solving those cases in which it is asserted that
the law chosen by the parties is not reasonably related to the
transaction. That sentence states that the law chosen by the parties
will meet the test of reasonableness if a significant portion of either
the making or the performance is to occur or occurs in the chosen
jurisdiction. The entire commercial transaction is to be divided into
its principal components, formation and performance; and only a
portion of either of these components must be significant.
Consequently, even though the contact relied upon in choosing
applicable law could be classified as "insignificant" when measured
against all of the contacts involved in the entire commercial
transaction in dispute, nevertheless, that single contact may be
"See A.S. Rampell. Inc. v. Hyster Co., 3 N.Y.2d 369, 144 N.E.2d 371, 165 N.Y.S.2d 475
(1957).
13 UCC § 1-105, Comment i.
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"'significant" when measured against the isolated facts of the
contract's making or the facts of its performance, and thus
sufficient under 1-105 to justify choosing the law of that state.
The Seeman case cited in the Comment involved the question of
which state's usury statute was to govern a loan transaction
between a New York borrower and a Pennsylvania lender.
Although the loan agreement did not contain a choice of law
clause, the parties signed the notes and arranged for performance in
Pennsylvania, evidently for the purpose of having that state's usury
laws control (and uphold) the agreement. The Supreme Court, in
applying the law apparently intended by the parties, stated that the
commercial loan would be upheld if the loan was valid either at the
place of making or at the place of performance. The Court added
this limitation: "[Tjhe parties must act in good faith. . . . The
effect of the qualification is merely to prevent the evasion or
avoidance at will of the usury laws otherwise applicable, by the
parties' entering into the contract or stipulating for its performance
at a place which has no normal relation to the transaction and to
whose law they would otherwise be subject."",
When the Comment reference to Seeman is combined with the
statutory policy favoring party autonomy, the result is that the
parties' choice should be upheld unless the transaction lacks a
normal connection with the state whose law was selected. Only
when it is shown that the contact did not occur in the normal
course of the transaction, but was contrived to validate the parties'
choice of governing law, should the relation be held unreasonable;
in other cases, the clause should be upheld.17 Courts should guard
against combining notions of sovereignty in choice of law with the
flexibility of the Code's "reasonable relation" test to strike down
the selected law-leaving the parties with an uncertainty which the
Code was designed to eliminate.
One apparently simple case may cause difficulty under the
"274 U.S. at 408. Although the Seeman case did not involve an explicit choice of law
clause, it has been frequently cited by cases in which the validity of such a clause is in issue.
See. e.g.. Consol. Jewelers. Inc. v. Standard Fin. Corp.. 325 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir. 1963);
Merchants' & M'gs. Sec. Co. v. Johnson, 69 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1934); Ury v. Jewelers
Acceptance Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d II. 38 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1964).
U See RESTATEIMENT (SECOND). CONFLICT O,1 LAWS § 332a. comment f (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1960). Other readings of UCC § 1-105 aresuggested in Tuchler, Boundaries to Part Autlononly
in the Uniforn Commercial Code: A Radical View, I I ST. Louis L.J. 180 (1967).
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peculiar wording of 1-105: ". . . when a transaction bears a
reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation
the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such
other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties."
Difficulties may arise if the transaction has no connection with the
forum state but does have contacts with one or more other states.
In such a case should the forum give effect to the choice of law
agreement, or should it hold that the agreement is invalid simply
because there was no reasonable relation to the forum?' The
answer clearly ought to be that the agreement is effective. In such a
situation the forum has no interest in the outcome of the litigation;
no local policy is called into play since, by hypothesis, the forum
has no reasonable connection with the transaction and is providing
only a situs for the suit." Moreover, the Code expresses a policy
favoring party autonomy. If the chosen law is from a jurisdiction
which has a reasonable connection with the facts of the transaction,
the clause should be upheld although for this case the Code is
inartfully drafted. "20 In short, section 1-105 ought to be read as the
Comment suggests:
Subsection (I) states affirmatively the right of the parties to a
multi-state transaction or a transaction involving foreign trade to
choose their own law. That right is subject to the firm rules stated
in the six subsections listed in subsection (2), and is limited to
jurisdictions to which the transaction bears a "reasonable
relation."
"3 Another alternative is open to the courts. It may dismiss the case under a doctrine of
forum non conveniens. Such dismissal should rest on the lack of any significant contact with
the forum and could be applied to sales cases under the same tests as used for actions
generally. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Kamas State Bank v. American
Sur. Co., 285 F. Supp. 430 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
Federal courts may transfer "any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought" under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964). For the applicable law in that
situation, see Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). See also Norwood v. Kirkpatrick,
349 U.S. 29 (1955) (power of federal courts under § 1404 is broader than the doctrine of
forum non conveniens).
1" For a Code case involving a situation where the forum had no connection with the
transaction (but in which there was no express agreement as to applicable law) see Associates
Discount Corp. v. Cary, 47 Misc. 2d 369, 262 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Civ. Ct. 1965).
2 A similar result could be reached through an application of the doctrine of renvoi. The
local court could refer to the law of that state whose law was chosen by the parties as the
-appropriate' law under the second sentence of UCC § 1-105(l) (see n.70 infra), and then
apply the whole Code of that state including its version of UCC § i-105(I) - to uphold the
parties' choice.
2- UCC § 1-105, Comment I.
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The Necessity of Agreement
Thus far only one limitation on party autonomy has been
considered-the reasonable relation requirement-and it has been
argued that this limitation should operate only rarely to restrict the
parties' choice of applicable law. Section 1-105, however, contains
other limitations which may have a greater impact in policing
choice of law clauses than will the reasonable relation limit. The
Code states that the parties may agree as to the law which will
govern their rights and duties. "Agree" is not defined, but certainly
its meaning will be shaped by the definition of "agreement": "the
bargain of the parties in fact .... ,,22 This bargain is to be found
in the language the parties used and from circumstances
surrounding the transaction, but simply because the choice of law
clause is found in the fine print of a take-it-or-leave-it document
does not mean that this was the bargain of the parties-that they
agreed to the clause.23
The line between allowable pressure and forbidden over-
reaching, though a difficult one to draw, has been delineated by
several courts. 24 Using doctrines of contract interpretation,
inadequacy of consideration, fraud, mistake, sharp bargain, and
duress, courts attempt to preserve maximum freedom of contract
without allowing the parties to destroy the process of agreement.
The nature of the problem prevents the framing of fixed rules and
requires courts to proceed on a case-by-case basis, working with
general principles of what a consensual transaction ought to be.
Choice of law clauses in an agreement are no exception, and to
the extent that such clauses have been agreed upon by the parties,
the Code commands their enforcement. However, the court must
not abdicate its task of determining whether the parties have
agreed. This does not mean that the clause must have been
discussed or that the complaining party must have read the clause.
Rather, the clause must have been fairly enough obtained so that it
ought to become a part of the total legal obligations of the parties,
a determination which calls into play the doctrines of contract
- UCC § 1-201(3).
-Cj. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See also
Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conlct oj'Lat'w. 53 COLMM. L. REv. 1072 (1953).
2' See Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective 45 MicH. L. REv. 253 (1947);
Schuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 Ti.NiP. L.Q. 125, 281 (1962).
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formation and interpretation by which all provisions of an
agreement are tested.
One Code section which can be used to police party autonomy
is 1-103:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the
law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel,
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or
other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its
provisions.
This section gives direct Code authority for applying the
contractual principles already discussed in determining the scope of
the obligations arising out of the parties' agreement. Further,
section 1-203, which imposes an obligation of good faith in the
performance of every Code contract, can be used to strengthen an
argument under 1-103.
For sales transactions the Code's unconscionability provision,
2-302, can form another base from which to test the enforceability
of a choice of law clause. This section gives a court the power,
which had been judicially developed long before this section was
enacted, to refuse to enforce any clause found to be unconscionable.
Such a finding may apply to the choice of law clause whenever the
court believes that it was not agreed upon by the parties or that the
law chosen had no normal connection with the bargain 6
UCC § 1-103.
There have been no reported cases in which the court has been asked to strike a choice
of law clause on the basis that the clause or its method of procurement was unconscionable.
There is, however, nothing unique about these clauses and general doctrines of
unconscionability developed in other contexts should apply to agreements as to applicable
law. The leading case is Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965). Other cases which have applied this section include Home Improvement, Inc. v.
Mactver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964) (court found that writing did not comply with
local retail installment act and also that contract was unenforceable because buyers "were
paying $1,609 for goods and services valued at far less"); Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super.
500, 247 A.2d 701 (1968) (court found contract was induced by fraud and also that price
paid for goods was exorbitant); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240
A.2d 195 (1968) (disclaimer of warranty clause held unenforceable, one ground being that the
clause violated 2-302); Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Carter, 56 Misc. 2d 463, 288 N.Y.S.2d 817
(Sup. Ct.), affd per curiam, 295 N.Y.S.2d 606 (App. Div. 1968) (Court held unconscionable a
clause by which the parties (a Maine corporation and a Massachusetts resident) agreed to sub-
mit to the jurisdiction of a New York court); and Frostifresh Corp v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d
26, 274 N.Y.S. 2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1967), revd in part, 54 Misc. 2d 119,281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App.
Div. 1967) (sales techniques and price made contract unconscionable, and price term was re-
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The Implied Agreement
Although the parties' agreement with respect to applicable law
has been assumed to be an express statement in a clause of the
contract, the term "agree" would appear to be broad enough to
include an implied agreement that the laws of a certain jurisdiction
are to control the transaction. As previously indicated the word
"agree" is not defined in the Code,2 but "agreement" is defined to
include the bargain of the parties as found in their language "or by
implication from other circumstances. 28 If in a particular case the
preponderance of contacts of a transaction are with one
jurisdiction, and if the parties were (or should have been) familiar
with that jurisdiction's laws, and if nothing is expressly stipulated
as to choice of law, the circumstances clearly suggest that the
parties implicitly agreed on that law as the applicable law. Nothing
in the history of section 1-105 indicates that the drafters intended
the word "agree" to mean anything more than the usual express
choice of law clause, but an expanded reading of "agree" is not
inconsistent with the language or policy of the Code."
Furthermore, pre-Code case law suggests such a reading.0
The easiest way for a court to avoid this problem of implied
agreement would be to use the second sentence of 1-105 to apply
the law of the jurisdiction with the preponderance of contacts,
thereby -considering that jurisdiction as having the "appropriate
relation" to the transaction. (Such an interpretation of the second
sentence of 1-105 is expanded below.) If, however, the court does
not accept the suggested interpretation, the finding of an implied
agreement under the first sentence of 1-105 can be employed to
written by court). The Williams and American Home cases are analyzed in Leff. Unconscion-
ability and the Code- The Emperor's Nest' Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
2 UCC § 1-201(3).
But see Lyles v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 239 Ark. 738, 393 S.W.2d 867 (1965),
which assumes that an express agreement is needed under UCC § 1-105.
1 E.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144 (1901);
Prichard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882); Grand v. Livingston, 4 App. Div. 589, 38 N.Y.S.
490 (1896). See also Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927): Green v.
Northwestern Trust Co., 128 Minn. 30, 150 N.W. 229 (1914); Chinchilla v. Foreign
Tankship Corp., 195 Misc. 895, 91 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1949).
The more recent "'grouping of contacts" approach to choice of law can be explained on a
presumed intent (or agreement) basis. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954);
Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wash. 2d 893, 425 P.2d 623 (1967).
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reach a sensible result: the application of the most appropriate law
for the transaction, considering the problem presented to the court.
Impact on Third Parties
Although the parties may agree as to the law which will govern
their rights and duties, such agreement will not be binding on third
parties to the transaction. This limitation on party autonomy is
exemplified in some of the exceptions contained in subsection (2) of
1-I05. t Another of these exceptions is found in section 2-402,
which provides that situs law is to be used to determine the rights
of creditors of a seller who has retained possession of sold goods.
Here third parties to the sale, the creditors, have intervened, and
any choice of law rule agreed upon in the seller-buyer contract will
have no impact on those third parties. Furthermore, most third
parties will fit under one of the exceptions listed in 1-105(2),
although those exceptions may not be exhaustive. The general tenor
of the Code thus seems to indicate that no third party should be
bound by a choice of law clause.
A case involving this third-party limitation on party autonomy
is Industrial Packaging Products Co. v. Fort Pitt Packaging Int'l
Inc.,32 in which Fort Pitt assigned to a lender all payments due or
to become due under a contract which Fort Pitt had with the
United States. The contract of assignment contained a clause
providing that the "agreement and performance thereof shall in all
respects be governed by and in accordance with the laws of the
state of New York." The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated
that this clause was binding as between the parties but held that the
rights of Fort Pitt's creditors were not affected by the choice of law
agreement. "Otherwise, it would be possible for two parties to
render nugatory as to third parties an Act of Assembly passed for
the benefit of such third parties."' The result of this case caif be
explained either on the basis that Article 9 transactions are
expressly exempted from section 1-10531 or on the wording of I-
105(1): The parties may agree as to the system of law which will
govern their rights and duties.
' See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
399 Pa. 643, 161 A.2d 19 (1960).
Id. at 647; 161 A.2d at 21.
UCC § 1-105(2): UCC §§ 9-102, 103.
Vol. 1969: 623]
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
Public Policy of the Forum
One limitation courts should not place on choice of law clauses
in commercial transactions is the long-recognized principle that the
public policies of the forum are not to be overridden by the
application of foreign law. The proposed RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
CONFLICT OF LAWS expands this public policy exception by
providing that the law chosen by the parties will be used to
determine the validity of a contract unless (among other things)
"application of the chosen law would be contrary to a fundamental
policy of the state which would be the state of the governing law in
the absence of an effective choice by the parties.""5
The Code contains no public policy exception to party
autonomy in choosing applicable law, and none should be read in
by the courts. It may well be that for the general area of conflict of
laws some restrictions are needed on allowing parties to contract
out from under local policies, but no such exception is required in
commercial law where states have almost unanimously agreed on
the basic Code policies. Although local Code variations have
occurred which could be decisive in a particular case, these
variations do not express some fundamental policy, "some
deep-rooted tradition of the common weal," 37 which should override
legislative approval of the Code in general or of the doctrine of
party autonomy in specific. There is no longer room in commercial
law for a notion that because the rules applied to a particular
problem vary in their detail, those details express some principle of
strong local policy negating the parties' own choice of law. "
THE APPROPRIATE RELATION TEST
If choice of law problems arise in a transaction not covered by
subsection (2) of 1-105 and if the parties have not designated the
governing law, the forum's version of the Code "applies to
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 332a (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960). There is
practically no direct authority on the application of public policy to strike a choice of law
clause. The only case found bearing on this problem is Fricke v. lsbrandtsen Co., 151 F.
Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
-Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, II1, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918).
" Cf. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d I 11,
204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965); Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d
9,203 N.E.2d 210,254 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1964).
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transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state. ' 3 9 Some
have read these words as a command to the forum to apply its
local Code irrespective of how closely the facts of the transaction
are connected with some other state-if the transaction bears an
appropriate relation to the forum.0 A literal reading of the Code
rule supports this conclusion, and such forum-orientation,
reminiscent of Wachter's writings during the 19th century,41 might
even receive the partial support of Professor Ehrenzweig 2, and find
a theoretical base in some of the earlier writings of Professor
Currie. 3 Unfortunately, a strict "forum" approach could destroy
predictability in multi-state commercial transactions because at the
time the contract of sale is made, it may be impossible to predict
the location of the forum for potential litigation. It is, however, too
late to think seriously about amending the Code's general choice of
law rule. Persuading more than 50 legislatures to amend section 1-
105 is probably impossible. Instead, the task must be less
ambitious: to determine the meaning of the words in the Code rule
and how those words can be used, and in this respect, the history of
1-105 is particularly helpful.
History of the Appropriate Relation Test
The choice of law provision in the 1952 version of the Code was
not stated in terms of an appropriate relation. Rather the
provision, in addition to providing for party autonomy, specified
certain minimal contacts which, if found to exist, would provide a
basis for the application by the forum of its version of the Code to
transactions having interstate connections. For example, Article 2
on Sales was to be applied if:
1. The contract was made in the state, or
2. The offer was made in the state, or
UCC § 1-105(1).
"Cf Weintraub, Choice of Law in Contract, 54 IOWA L. REv. 399, 418 (1968);
Weintraub, Choice of Law for Products Liability: The Impact of the Uniforni Commercial
Code & Recent Developments in Conflicts Analysis, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 1429, 1436-37 (1966).
One of the authors ofthis article is guilty of such a public statement, tor which he now recants.
Nordstrom, Choice of Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 364 (1963).
1 Wachter, On the Collision of Private Laws of Different States, 13 Ai. J. CoP. L. 417
(1964).
A. EHRENZ\VEIG, CoNruIcT OF LAws 307-46, 464 (1962).
Compare Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE
L.J. 171 with Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & "CONTEMP. PROB. 755 (1963).
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3. The acceptance occurred in the state, or
4. The contract was to be performed or completed wholly
within the state, or
5. The contract was to be performed or completed in part
within the state, or
6. The contract related to or involved goods "which are to be
or are in fact delivered, shipped or received" within the state, or
7. The contract involved "a bill of lading, warehouse receipt or
other document of title which is to be or is in fact issued, delivered,
sent or received" within the state, or
8. The contract "is an application or agreement for a credit
made, sent or received within this state, or involves a credit issued
in this state or under which drafts are to be presented in this state
or confirmation or advice of which is sent or received within this
state, or involves any negotiation within this state or a' draft drawn
under a credit," or
9. The transaction occurred within the state.
Since the phrases were connected with an "or," the existence of
any one of these contacts would suffice to make the local Code
applicable to the sales transaction.
A desire to have the Code applied to as many transactions as
possible apparently motivated the drafters to formulate the choice
of law provision in the manner they did. When first promulgated,
it was not expected that the Code would receive anything
approaching unanimous acceptance for years or perhaps decades,
and for a period of about five years it appeared that the Code
might never receive approval except from a handful of states.*
Nevertheless, the drafters firmly believed that the Code was a
marked improvement over prior law and ought to be applied to as
many transactions as possible.!' One way to accomplish this goal
was to seek further adoptions; this they did through amendments
41 UCC § 1-105 (1952 version).
4 Between 1952 and 1960 only five states adopted the Code. These were Pennsylvania
(1953), Massachusetts (1957), Kentucky (1958), Connecticut (1959), and New Hampshire
(1959). During the next seven years the Code was enacted in 44 states, the District of
Columbia, and the Virgin Islands.
46 Although the comments to the 1952 Code did not expressly state that this was the reason
for adopting a forum-oriented rule, this motive was acknowledged in the 1958 and 1962
comments: "Application of the Code in such circumstances may be justified by its
comprehensiveness, by the policy of uniformity, and by the fact that it is in large part a
rerormulation and restatement of the law merchant and of the understanding of a business
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designed to meet justified criticisms which had been raised.47
Another approach was to encourage the application of adopted
Codes to as many commercial transactions as could
constitutionally be reached, and this the drafters accomplished by
selecting a choice of law provision which permitted the forum to
apply the Code to all transactions in which there was at least a
minimal connection between the forum and the transaction. If the
Code was adopted in states having a sizeable number of commercial
transactions, Code policies would govern a significant portion of
the country's commerce which, in turn, could lead to further Code
adoptions.
There were immediate objections to the 1952 version of 1-105:i8I
Some attacked the policy which formed the basis of the section;
others questioned the constitutionality of the rule. The Code
approach was strikingly different from both the vested rights
theory,49 which was still followed by most courts, and the newer
approaches to choice of law problems. Critics who objected to the
Code rule on policy grounds focused on the forum shopping
encouraged by the Code.50 Forum shopping was a definite
community which transcends state and even national boundaries." UCC § 1-105, Comment
3.
Professor Goodrich denies that a forum-oriented rule was selected because of a "primitive
view that a state will resolve all legal problems with foreign contacts solely according to its
own laws because it deems its law the best or most enlightened." Goodrich, C'onflict Niceties
& Comunercial Necessities, 1952 Wisc. L. REV. 199, 202. He suggests the explanation, not
incompatible with that set out above, that the rule was adopted to insure that the law of a
single state governed the entire transaction. Id. at 202. This was not the case under pre-Code
law. See REsTATE. iENT, CONFLICT OF LAWs §§ 332, 358 (1934).
AT he 1952 official draft was revised in 1957 and supplemented in 1958. As revised, the
Code was printed in a 1958 Official Text. Further revisions resulted in a 1962 Official Text.
Additional amendments were suggested in 1966.
"- One of the earliest objections to the pre-1952 drafts came from a number of teachers of
Conflict of Laws who met in 1949 and passed a resolution which stated that UCC § 1-105 (in
both forms which they reviewed) "is unwise and should be omitted from the Code." This
resolution is reproduced in Rheinstein, Conflict of Laws in the Uniform Commercial Code,
16 LAW & CONTE.IP. PROB. 114, 115 (1951). See also Freund, Analysis of Conflicts of Law
Provisions of Section 1-105, 1955 N.Y. LAW REvisION Co.m'N REP. (vol. 1) 175; Smith,
Conflicts and Chaos or Contract and Unjormnity: The Uniforni Comninercial Code 2 U.KAN.
L. REv. 11 (1953).
19 For a discussion of the vested rights theory, see E. STIMSON, CONFLICT OF LAws 80
(1963); Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58
HARv. L. REv. 361, 379-85 (1945). See also I J. BEALE. TREATisE ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWs § 5A, at 53 (1935).
O Stumberg, Conintercial Paper and the Conflict of Laws, .6 VAND. L. REv. 489, 503
(1953). The use of choice of law rules to prevent the accident of the forum from determining
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possibility, especially in areas such as open price agreements where
the Code radically changed prior law.
Those who attacked the Code choice of law provision on
constitutional grounds maintained that the rule, in attempting to
make the Code applicable to transactions having only the slightest
factual connection with the forum, violated the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. To support their argument the critics
cited Home Insurance Co. v. Dick," a 1930 case in which the
Supreme Court in emphasizing the absence of contacts between the
forum state, Texas, and the transaction, specifically discounted the
fact that the forum was the permanent residence of one of the
parties and overturned an application of forum law. According to
the Court, "Texas was . . . without power to affect the terms of
contract so made. Its attempt to impose a greater obligation than
that agreed upon and to seize property in payment of the imposed
obligation violates the guaranty against deprivation of property
without due process of law."52 The critics of the Code contended
that the Court had never relinquished all controls over state choice
of law, and that the Code's contacts, like the contact in Dick, were
constitutionally insufficient 3
Drawing upon policy arguments, defenders of the 1952 version
of 1-105 contended that there was a need for one law to apply to
an entire transaction; and that the Code, which was based in large
part on a "reformulation and restatement of the law merchant and
of the understanding of a business community which transcends
state and even national boundaries, '5 should be that law. The
Code's policies were to be preferred over non-Code doctrines, and
the application of the Code to all aspects of commercial
transactions would promote simplicity and facilitate commerce 5
With respect to the constitutional objections to the Code, the
supporters suggested that Dick had been impliedly overruled by
the outcome of the litigation has been expressed in several non-contract cases as well. See.
e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). See generally Linn v. Employers Reinsurance
Corp., 392 Pa. 58, 139 A.2d 638 (1958); Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36
W. VA. L.Q. 156 (1930).
"281 U.S. 397 (1930).
Id. at 408.
= Rheinstein, Conflict of Laws in the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 114, 120 (1951).
5UCC § 1-105, Comment 3.
-Goodrich, supra note 46, at 202.
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later decisions which appeared to return to the states the
formulation of choice of law rules6 If not overruled, Dick could be
read as holding only that the forum could not apply its law when
the only connection with the transaction was that the suit was
brought there. The Code clearly required something more than that
connection.
These arguments were never resolved. The 1958 version of the
Code contained a new rule-that currently found in section 1-105.
The relationship of the present "appropriate relation" test to the
prior enumeration of contacts is not clear. It is arguable that
"appropriate relation" is no more than a generic term for the more
specific details of the 1952 version. If this is the case, the
arguments over the 1952 rule apply equally to the present
formulation of 1-105. On the other hand, it can be contended that
the new test, in response to the criticism of the 1952 version, was
designed to require a closer connection between the facts and thie
forum jurisdiction 7 A third, and most likely, explanation is that
the drafters intended to affirm party autonomy and leave to the
courts the task of deciding choice of law problems on a case-by-
case basis whenever the parties have not selected the law to govern
their transaction.
The Comments and the Cases
Little assistance as to the scope of an appropriate relation or
the connection between the 1952 and present rules is found in the
Comments, which merely state that the determination of "what
relation is 'appropriate' is left to judicial decision," while
reiterating that courts deciding cases under the Code are not bound
by pre-Code conflicts cases 8 The only relations excluded by the
Comments as "not appropriate" are those in which the forum's
sole contact is its status as forum, and where the parties clearly
contracted with reference to some other law; for example, where the
law of the places of contracting and performance are the same but
contrary to forum law.
4 E.g., Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965); Clay v. Sun lns. Office, Ltd., 377
U.S. 179 (1964). See Comment, The Uniformn Commercial Code and Conflict of Laws, 9
A i. J. Co.ip. L. 458 (1960).
-See Cullen, Cotnlict of Laws Problems Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 KY.
L.J. 417, 425 (1960); cf. Reese, The Uniform Commercial Code and its Application in the
Non-Code States, 15 BAYLOR L. REv. 291, 301 (1963).
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Thus far appellate courts have not been required to consider the
full meaning of an "appropriate relation." In Skinner v. Tober
Foreign Molors, Inc.,-" the seller of an airplane was a
Massachusetts corporation with its principal place of business in
Massachusetts. Both negotiation and execution of the contract took
place in Massachusetts, and delivery was made in that state.
Shortly thereafter the airplane developed engine trouble, and the
buyers, being financially unable to keep up the payments and at the
same time repair or replace the engine, offered to return the
airplane in cancellation of the agreement. Instead, the seller orally
agreed to reduce the monthly payments so that the buyers could
proceed with the repairs. While the buyers, residents of
Connecticut, were meeting their obligations under the oral
agreement-but in default of the written agreement-the seller took
the airplane from Connecticut (where it was kept) and returned it
to Massachusetts. The buyers brought suit against the seller in a
Massachusetts court, seeking equitable replevin or damages.
Affirming an award of damages for the buyers, the court pointed
out that there was no evidence as to where the oral modification
was made and held that Massachusetts law applied because the
transaction bore an appropriate relation to that state. Since the
Code (then effective in Massachusetts but not in Connecticut)
dispensed with the requirement of consideration to support a
contractual modification, the buyers were entitled to recovery.
In contrast to Skinner, in Park County Implement Co. v.
Craig6D the only transactional connection with the non-Code state
was that the buyer took delivery of the goods there. All other
contacts were with the Code state (Wyoming) including the
residence of the parties, the place where the goods were ordered,
and the place to which the goods were taken after delivery. The
seller sued the buyer in Wyoming for the price after the goods were
destroyed by fire. The court held that the transaction bore an
appropriate relation to Wyoming and that the Wyoming Code
determined whether there had been an acceptance of the goods. The
relation to the non-Code state was described as "minor."' '7
: UCC § 1-105, Comment 3.
"' 345 Mass. 429, 187 N.E.2d 669 (1963).
-397 P.2d 800 (Wyo. 1964).
61 Other Code cases include Silver v. Sloop Silver Cloud, 259 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (place of making and payment); Lyles v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 23 Ark. 738, 393
640 [Vol. 1969: 623
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The Meaning of "'Appropriate Relation"
The basic reason for including a forum-oriented choice of law
rule in the Code-the maximization of the number of commercial
transactions which would be subject to the Code's
policies-assumes that only a few states have adopted the Code and
that most of the cases tried in a Code state will involve, some
factual connections with non-Code states. Today, however, all but
one of the states have adopted the Code, and there is no longer a
tug-of-war between the enlightened answers of the Code and the
older answers it displaced. Except in international transactions,
almost all commercial choice of law problems will arise between
Code states; the goal which motivated the selection of the forum-
oriented choice of law rule, the wide-spread use of the Code in
solving commercial problems, has been achieved through legislative
acceptance of the Code. The choice of law problem continues.,
nevertheless, in those areas in which the adopted statutes or their
interpretations differ.
Fortunately, the test chosen by the drafters, that the relation
must be appropriate, gives the courts freedom to develop rational
choice of law rules and apply them to commercial transactions.
A relation which was appropriate when the problem was whether to
apply a newly drafted comprehensive code or the law of a non-Code
state does not necessarily continue to be appropriate when all states
involved have the same basic legislation. In the early cases, a
court could justify finding an overriding policy supporting Code
application because it represented a "reformulation and restatement
of the law merchant and the understanding of a business
community which transcends state and even national boundaries." 2
In short, the Code could have been applied simply because it came
the closest to protecting the justified expectations of the
businessmen involved. However, that reason for adopting a forum-
oriented approach disappears once all the states have adopted the
Code. The appropriate relation which requires application of a parti-
cular state's law can now be redefined in light of the policies underly-
ing the state's conflict rules. Thus a court is free to develop further
choice of law policies and to refine the process which it began in
cases like Skinner and Park County.
S.W.2d 867 (1965); Atlas Credit Corp. v. Dolbow, 193 Pa. Super. 649. 165 A.2d 704 (1960)
(applying 1952 text of Code).
I UCC § 1-105, Comment 3.
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Although it is not possible to review all the policies which can
be promoted through choice of law rules, it should be suggested at
this point that 1-105 is flexible enough to reach at least these goals
in cases presenting choice of law problems 3
1. Separate the true conflicts cases from the false ones. In
some interstate transactions there is no necessary conflict among
the laws involved-even though there is a difference in the language
of the Code sections as adopted by the various states. For example,
suppose that State A has adopted the 1962 official version of
section 2-318 which extends warranties to the family, household,
and guests (in the home) of the buyer, but has refused to accept the
invitation of the Comments to increase the number of persons
within the protected class. 4 One reason for not extending 2-318
could be a policy of supporting and promoting manufacturing in
State A by limiting manufacturers' liabilities for goods sold within
the state. Suppose, however, that State B has amended its version
of 2-318 to extend warranties to any person who reasonably might
be expected to be affected by the goods-even though they are not
within the family, household, or guest classification adopted in
State A.5 s Here the policy might be one of insuring that injured
persons, including at least State B residents, will have funds to pay
doctor and hospital bills and will not become charges upon the
welfare taxes of State B.66 Suppose further that a car was
manufactured and sold to Buyer in State B. Buyer and his
employer (both residents of State B) attended a convention in State
A where the employer, while a passenger in Buyer's car, was
injured because of a defective part in the automobile.
Under these facts a court could reasonably conclude that there
is no conflict in the policies underlying the different versions of 2-
See Weintraub, The Contracts Proposals of the Second Restatement of Conflict of
Laws-A Critique, 46 1ovA L. REv. 713, 713-19 (1961). These considerations were
originally set out in Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law. 52 COLUNI. L.
REv. 959 (1952). See also Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,
1959 DUKE L.J. 171; Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?. 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657
(1959).
" See, e.g.. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963); Marcus
v. Spada Bros. Auto Serv., 41 Pa. D. & C. 2d 794 (Phila. County Ct. 1967).
"See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965). For two other expanded versions of UCC
§ 2-318 see PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REP.
No. 3 (1966). California and Utah omitted the section altogether.
"See Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Autontation in the Conflict of
Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958).
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3187 Since the car was not manufactured in State A, State A's
policy of promoting State A manufacturing will not be harmed by
extending the warranty protection to the employer. State B's policy
of providing added protection to its citizens through an expanded
warranty provision will be advanced by applying State B's version
of the Code. Thus, if such a problem is presented to a court in
State A, that court ought to use the "appropriate relation" test to
sort out the policies underlying the sections of the apparently
conflicting Codes and, in a proper case, determine that it is not
appropriate to apply State A's version of 2-318 because the relation
of the parties to State A under these facts does not present a case
in which the policies underlying State A law have any concern.
Furthermore, this result should not be altered despite the fact that
Buyer may have mailed the purchase order from State A while
Buyer was on a State A vacation, or that the automobile was
delivered from State B to Buyer while he was temporarily in State
A, or because Buyer had arranged for credit with a State A
bank-all factual connections which would have required
application of State A's Code under the 1952 version of 1-105.
2. Provide a rational basis for the solution of the true conflicts
case. A so-called "true" conflicts case can be presented by
returning to the automobile purchase case above but reversing the
states of the purchase and the injury. Had Buyer purchased the
automobile in State A from a State A manufacturer, and had the
injury to the employer occurred while the parties were in State B,
State A's policy of promoting manufacturing by limiting the
number of persons who can recover for injuries caused by
defective goods collides with State B's policy of p'roviding
compensation for injured plaintiffs-especially if the employer and
Buyer are residents of State B. It is this kind of case which
presently is being subjected to critical analysis by judges and
writers.68 As yet no single solution has been agreed upon by the
r This type of analysis is used on the problem of the applicable statute of frauds in
Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961). See also
McCrossin v. Hicks Chevrolet, Inc., 248 A.2d 917 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
"See A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUT.IAN. THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 76-79
(1965), and the reference to the articles by Professor Currie, especially Currie, The
Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26
U. CHI. L. REv. 9 (1958). See also A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 309-26, 247-54
(1962); Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflections on Reading Cavers.
the Choice-of-Law Process, 46 TEXAs L. REv. 141 (1967). For a "true" conflicts case in
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courts, nor is one suggested in this article. It merely is urged here
that the "appropriate relation" test is sufficiently broad to enable
courts of Code states to continue their development of choice of
law principles and not feel bound to apply forum law in a
commercial transaction simply because they find a minimum
contact between the facts of the transaction and the forum. For
example, to the extent that the forum court believes that true
conflicts cases ought to be solved by reference to the law of the
state with the most significant connection with the transaction,.
only a slight wrench of Code language is required to classify this
connection as the "appropriate relation" and to apply that policy
to a section 1-105 transaction.
3. To the extent possible, minimize he impact which the
accident of the forum has in determining the outcome of the
litigation. Certainty and predictability, worthy goals in commercial
transactions, will be unobtainable as long as forum law is applied
simply because that forum has some minimal contact with the
underlying transaction. On some occasions this loss is unnecessary.
For example, in the false conflicts case discussed under 1,
supra, it was concluded that the assumed policies indicated that
it was not appropriate in such a case for the forum to apply
its version of the Code in framing a rule of decision. Such a
conclusion, however, is negative in its impact; it says only that the
forum Code should not be applied. It can further be suggested that
the forum court should frame a rule of decision patterned after that
version of the Code whose policies will be promoted by the solution
of the legal problems presented by the factual pattern of the specific
litigation-in the assumed case, this would be the law of State B.
torts, see Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1961).
"See Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954); Baffin Land Corp. v.
Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wash. 2d 893, 425 P.2d 623 (1967); RESTATEIENT
(SECOND). CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960). For a discussion of
4dditional approaches to choice of law problems, see D. CAVERS. THE CHOICE-OF-LAW
PROCESS 59-87. 114-38 (1965).
' Associates Discount Corp. v. Cary. 47 Misc. 2d 369, 262 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Civ. Ct. 1965),
may illustrate such a wrench, although the decision probably rests on UCC § 9-103. The state-
ment in the text may be supported by the suggestions made in Ideal Structures Corp. v. Levine
Huntsville Dev. Corp., 396 F.2d 917, 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1968). Unfortunately, the court in this
non-Code case was not free to pursue the suggestion since it was bound by the state choice of
law rule. Seealso Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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Such application minimizes the importance of the forum without
sacrificing any local policy. Likewise, the suggested reading of 1-
105(1) in the true conflicts case (see 2, supra) insulates a
commercial transaction from the happenstance of the forum to the
same extent that the forum's general choice of law rules seek this
goal.
Admittedly, this suggested interpretation of the appropriate
relation test of 1-105(1) takes some liberty with the Code's terse
language. However, 1-105 was drafted for situations in which it
was assumed that only a few states had the Code, and the drafters
thus intended that its comprehensive restatement of the law
merchant have the widest possible application.71 Now, following the
Code's wide adoption, the "appropriate relation" test can take on
new meaning, lose its forum-oriented direction, and promote
rational choice of law results.
CONCLUSION
The nearly unanimous acceptance of the Uniform Commercial
Code has eliminated many of the choice of law problems which
once existed in interstate commercial transactions. Although some
teachers of Conflict of Laws may mourn the demise of these
problems, the practicing lawyer and his business clients have reason
to rejoice. Considerable certainty has replaced extensive confusion.
There remain, however, areas of commercial law in which
legislatures and courts in one state promote policies different from
those of the legislatures and courts in other states. The Code, with
one of the most comprehensive choice of law statutes yet enacted,
- The conclusion that the drafters intended to state a forum-oriented rule only during the
time that the Code was effective in a few jurisdictions is supported by the terse command of
UCC § 1-105: "Failing such agreement this Act applies to transactions bearing an appropriate
relation to this state." No express provision was made for the case in which there existed no
appropriate relation to the forum. Should a court which is a disinterested forum, providing it
decides not to dismiss the case under some variation of the forum non conveniens doctrine.,
(I) return to pre-Code choice of law rules resting on place of making or place of
performance or whatever, or (2) seek out and apply the policies underlying the appropriate
relation test? The authors of this article contend that only the second alternative is
reasonable. The drafters were expressing a desire that the appropriate law be applied. Now
that all (or nearly all) of the states have the Code, the appropriate law need not be tied to
the forum. Such a reading of UCC § 1-105 is also supported by Comment 2 to UCC § 1-105:
"'Where there is no agreement as to the governing law, the Act [not this version of the Act] is
applicable to any transaction having an 'appropriate' relation to any state which enacts it."
Seealso D. CAVERS, THe'CHoIcE-oF-LAw PROcEss 233-40 (1965).
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seeks to retain certainty for the parties by allowing agreement as to
the law which will govern the transaction, subject only to the
requirement that the transaction have a "reasonable relation" to
the state whose laws are chosen-often a requirement of little
impact because businessmen simply do not choose to have their
transactions governed by laws that are strange to them.
Undoubtedly, the portion of the statutory grant of party autonomy
which will have the greatest. impact on policing choice of law
clauses is the requirement that the parties "agree" on the clause.
Here, common law contract notions of subjective and objective
mutual assent will continue to play their role.
The remaining cases, those in which the parties have not agreed
on applicable law, will present the hardest problems of statutory
interpretation. Courts must seek out something that the Code has
called an "appropriate" relation. On occasion this will be difficult
but a court need not compound the difficulty by believing that the
Code choice of law rules present a different process from that used
in other areas of conflict of laws. The "appropriate relation" test
frees the court from the narrow tests of prior Code versions such as
place of making or performance and allows it to adopt choice of
law rules resting on rational foundations. Furthermore, the Code
may someday form the base from which choice of law principles
can be enunciated in non-commercial areas.
[Vol. 1969: 623
